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1 Introduction
The joint analysis of the ﬁnancial and health-related decisions made by households reveals,
among others, four important stylized facts. The share of wealth invested in risky assets is
found to be increasing in both the wealth of the agents (e.g. Wachter and Yogo, 2008; Carroll,
2002), and in their health status (Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese, 1996; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Fan
and Zhao, 2009, among others). Moreover, the share of wealth spent on medical expenditures
is found to be decreasing in both wealth (e.g. Meer, Miller and Rosen, 2003; DiMatteo, 2003;
Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004; Acemoglu, Finkelstein and Notowidigdo, 2009, for similar results
based on the income shares), and in the health status (e.g. Smith, 1999; Yogo, 2009; Gilleskie
and Mroz, 2004). In other words, richer and healthier agents tend to hold riskier ﬁnancial
portfolios and spend proportionally less on health expenditures.
To rationalize these stylized facts, most studies focus on the eﬀects of wealth and health on
disposable resources, on preferences and on exposure to health, mortality and ﬁnancial risks (e.g.
Smith, 1999; Meer et al., 2003; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Puri and Robinson, 2007; Guiso and Paiella,
2008; Love and Smith, 2010; Pang and Warshawsky, 2010). However, this line of research also
highlights how diﬃcult it can be to discriminate among these competing hypotheses without
a solid anchoring in economic theory to guide the empirical evaluations. The main objective
of this paper is to provide such a mapping between theory and econometrics by performing
a structural empirical assessment of these potential explanations. More precisely, we attempt
to better understand the channels through which health and wealth determine ﬁnancial and
health-related choices by estimating the deep parameters of a joint dynamic model of health
expenditures and ﬁnancial decisions.
The theoretical model that we rely upon to understand the comparative statics of portfo-
lios and health expenditures is developed in Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St-Amour (2009). This
framework regroups two standard building blocks of the Financial and of the Health Economics
literature. More precisely, a dynamic portfolio problem a` la Merton (1971) is combined with a
human capital model of health expenditures a` la Grossman (1972), with physical depreciation
and convex adjustment costs. The model further embeds endogenous longevity as the agent can
(partially) reduce his mortality risk by improving health, but faces diminishing returns in doing
so. In addition to prolonging expected lifetime, health is further valuable in improving labor
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income, e.g. by reducing workdays lost when sick. The agent selects optimal consumption,
portfolio and health expenditures to maximize recursive preferences of the type advocated by
Duﬃe and Epstein (1992) and by Schroder and Skiadas (1999), and with minimal subsistence
consumption constraints appended.
As shown in Hugonnier et al. (2009), this joint model of ﬁnancial and health-related decisions
presents numerous advantages. First, the two channels of longevity and human capital values
of health provide an alternative to utility-based approaches. The latter remain subject to
debate with respect to the sign of the cross derivatives of health and consumption utility (e.g.
Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo, 2009), an eﬀect that plays a key role on portfolios and
health expenditures. Second, relying on a capital theory of health, with irreversible investments
and positive eﬀects of health on labor income and mortality, avoids treating health as an
ordinary asset that can be bought and sold freely on markets. Third, the non-expected utility
framework ensures an unconditional preference for life over death. In comparison, iso-elastic
VNM preferences require rescaling the utility function at certain curvature level to avoid counter-
factual preference for death. Fourth, minimal consumption entails binding liquidity constraints.
More risky asset holdings can be chosen when additional resources relax these constraints. Fifth
and most important, these features allow this model to potentially account for the four stylized
facts outlined earlier.
We use the closed-form rules derived by Hugonnier et al. (2009) for the estimation and
thus ensure a correspondence between the theoretical and empirical models. The structural
econometric model of health expenditures and portfolio allocations is estimated for retired
agents using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The estimation identiﬁes
the parameters for the preferences, health dynamics, mortality risk and for the income process.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, our preference parameters are consistent
with a binding subsistence consumption constraint and realistic relative risk aversion, as well
as an unconditional preference for life and low elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Second,
the technological and longevity parameters conﬁrm that health is subject to rapid depreciation
when investment is insuﬃcient, and show that both health and mortality risk can be adjusted,
but that the two are increasingly costly to change. Third, health has positive eﬀects on labor
income, even after retirement, and is therefore a signiﬁcant contributor to disposable resources.
2
Taken together, our results indicate that agents should and are able to adjust health and that
these two channels of higher quantity (i.e. longevity) and quality (i.e. consumption) of life are
crucial to understanding the eﬀects of health on ﬁnancial and health-related decisions.
These ﬁndings are fruitful to revisit the potential explanations for the stylized facts outlined
earlier. Indeed, an improvement in health not only increases both expected lifetime and human
capital, thus relaxing the minimal consumption constraint, but also lowers the returns to
health investments. This encourages the agent to reduce the health investment shares. The
concurrent change in the ﬁnancial portfolio composition is mainly driven by the relaxation of
the minimal consumption constraint which leads the agent to take more risky positions. A longer
expected lifetime at better health plays no role in explaining more risky portfolios since the asset
allocation is independent of the planning horizon when the ﬁnancial investment opportunity set
is constant. The model therefore reproduces the positive eﬀects of health on portfolios and its
negative eﬀect on health expenditure shares. In comparison, an increase in ﬁnancial wealth also
slackens the liquidity constraint, but it aﬀects neither the expected lifetime nor the returns to
health investment. This allows the agent to substitute away from health capital (when health
is suﬃciently high that returns to health investment are low) while encouraging more risky
ﬁnancial asset positions. The model is thus able to reproduce the positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial
wealth on risky portfolios and its negative eﬀect on health investment shares.
We perform robustness checks along many dimensions. In part, the model is derived under
the assumption of age-independent preferences, mortality risk and health dynamics parameters.
We verify and conﬁrm that this assumption is realistic by computing the predicted rules for
pre-retired agents and contrasting them with observed portfolios and health expenditures for
younger individuals in the HRS data base in an out-of-sample performance test. Second, our
benchmark estimation relies on a cross-section of the HRS panel, but we verify and conﬁrm that
all our key results are robust to sampling diﬀerent waves or age groups, incorporating socio-
economic covariates, controlling for health insurance and allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
in a panel estimation.
Our structural estimates also allow us to measure other variables of interest. First, we
evaluate the closed-form expressions for expected lifetime at the point estimates to verify and
conﬁrm that the model is consistent with plausible longevity. Moreover, we make use of the
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value function to compute the certainty equivalent value of life and the value of health explicitly.
We ﬁnd that an individual aged 75 with net ﬁnancial wealth of $300,000 would be willing to
pay between $35,000 (at poor health) and $276,000 (at excellent health) in exchange for a 1-
year increase in expected lifetime. We also ﬁnd that the value of one unit of health (i.e of
moving from one health category to an improved one) for that same agent is between $67,000
(at poor health) and $60,000 (at excellent health) and is almost exclusively attributable to the
human capital value (as opposed to mortality control value) of health. These results compare
advantageously with those found in the literature and lend further support to the structural
analysis.
The rest of the paper develops as follows. We outline the theoretical model in Section 2 and
discuss the estimation strategy as well as the data in Section 3. In Section 4 we present and
discuss the estimation results. Additional theoretical and empirical implications are presented
in Section 5. Finally, a conclusion in Section 6 reviews the main ﬁndings and discusses potential
research agendas.
2 A model of health expenditures and portfolio allocations
2.1 Theoretical model
Hugonnier et al. (2009) consider retired agents indexed 푗 = 1, 2, . . .who select period-푡 ≥ 0
consumption 푐푗,푡 ≥ 푎, health expenditures 퐼푗,푡 ≥ 0, as well as risky portfolio 휋푗,푡 so as to
maximize:
푈푗,푡 = 1{휏>푡}퐸푡
[∫ 휏
푡
(
푓(푐푗,푠, 푈푗,푠)− 훾
2푈푗,푠
∣휎푠(푈푗)∣2
)
d푠
]
(1)
푓(푐, 푣) =
푣휌
1− 1/휀
[(
푐− 푎
푣
)1−1/휀
− 1
]
, (2)
subject to:
d퐻푗,푡 =
(
퐼훼푗,푡퐻
1−훼
푗,푡 − 훿퐻푗,푡
)
d푡, 퐻푗,0 > 0, (3)
푌 r푗,푡 = 푦
r + 훽r퐻푗,푡, (4)
d푊푗,푡 = (푟푊푗,푡 + 푌
r
푗,푡 − 퐼푗,푡 − 푐푗,푡)d푡+푊푗,푡휋푗,푡휎(d푍푡 + 휙d푡), (5)
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and
lim
푠→0
1
푠
푃푡
[
푡 < 휏 ≤ 푡+ 푠] = 휆0 + 휆1
퐻휉푗,푡
, (6)
where the random time 휏 measures the time of death of the agent and 휎푡(푈) = d⟨푈,푍⟩푡/d푡
denotes the instantaneous volatility of the continuation utility. Individuals are assumed to be
heterogeneous with respect to their health 퐻푗,푡 and ﬁnancial wealth 푊푗,푡 levels. Conversely, the
preference, risk distribution and technological parameters are assumed to be time-independent
and identical across agents.
The recursive preferences in equations (1) and (2) are of the type proposed by Duﬃe and
Epstein (1992); Schroder and Skiadas (1999).1 The nonnegative parameters 휌, 푎, 휀 and 훾
respectively capture the agent’s subjective rate of time preference, his subsistence consumption
level, his elasticity of intertemporal substitution, as well as his risk aversion over static gambles.
As shown in Hugonnier et al. (2009), this speciﬁcation avoids scaling problems in standard
additive setups, thereby guaranteeing that life is always valuable regardless of parametric
values.2 Finally the nonnegativity constraint on health expenditures is standard in the Health
Economics literature and reﬂects the irreversibility of health investments by ruling out the
possibility of selling one’s health in markets.
In the spirit of Ehrlich (2000); Ehrlich and Chuma (1990); Hall and Jones (2007), the
endogenous mortality is assumed to follow a Poisson process whose death intensity is declining in
health. The parameter 휆0 ≥ 0 captures the health-independent (or endowed) death probability,
whereas 휆1 ≥ 0 encompasses the controllable components, and 휉 ≥ 0 measures the degree of
costs convexities in adjusting the death intensity. The locally deterministic process for health
1See also Kreps and Porteus (1979); Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) for discrete-time analogs.
2For an endogenous mortality problem with standard time additive power utility we have
푈푡 = 1{휏>푡}퐸푡
[∫ 휏
푡
푒−휌(푠−푡)
푐1−훾푠
1− 훾 d푠
]
,
and it follows that the agent strictly prefers life (푈푡 > 0) to death (푈푡 = 0) only when 훾 < 1. Since risk
aversion is often estimated to be above 1, the model counter-intuitively assumes preference for death. To avoid
this outcome, a constant 푢¯ ≫ 0 is often added to the CRRA functional: 푢(푐) = 푢¯ + (1 − 훾)−1푐1−훾 to insure
that the agent prefers life (e.g. Rosen, 1988; Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005; Hall and Jones, 2007, among
others). In comparison, recursive preferences (1) and (2) unconditionally imply 푈푡 > 0 when the agent is alive,
and consequently preference for life.
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in (3) is similar to Grossman (1972); Ehrlich (2000), with the parameter 훼 ∈ (0, 1) capturing
convexities in health adjustment costs, and 훿 ≥ 0 representing a depreciation rate.
The post-retirement income process 푌 r푗,푡 in (4) has 푦
r ≥ 0 for the health-independent (e.g.
pension) income, and 훽r ≥ 0 the sensitivity of labor income to the agent’s health. Speciﬁcally, a
healthier agent has an increased ability to work and receives higher income even after retirement.
As a result, health serves a dual purpose: improved health reduces mortality risk and at the
same time increases labor income. Finally, the wealth process (5) involves a single risky asset
with constant mean return 휇 ≥ 푟 and volatility 휎 > 0 on a univariate Brownian process d푍푡
and one riskless asset with return 푟 ≥ 0, with 휙 ≡ (휇− 푟)/휎 denoting the market price of risk.
2.2 Main theoretical results
The endogeneity of the death intensity (6) unfortunately implies that the model has no closed-
form solutions for the general case of 휆1 ∕= 0. To circumvent this diﬃculty, Hugonnier et al.
(2009) resort to an expansion analysis to approximate the optimal rules through an expansion
centered on the parameter 휆1 governing the health dependence of the Poisson intensity (6).
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More precisely, an explicit solution can be obtained for the restricted case of exogenous mortality
(휆1 = 0). This solution is then used as a benchmark for a 푛
푡ℎ−order expansion around 휆1
under the assumption of a small value for that parameter.4 Adapting the theoretical results in
Hugonnier et al. (2009) to the post-retirement phase reveals the following:
Theorem 1 Assume that the following conditions hold:
퐴 ≡ 휀휌+ (1− 휀)
(
푟 − 휆0 + 1
2훾
휃2
)
> 0, (7)
훽r < (푟 + 훿)
1
훼 , (8)
퐴 >
(
푟 − 휆0 + 1
훾
휃2
)+
, (9)
Δ−1 ≡ 퐴+ 휉
(
(훼퐵)
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
> 푟 − 휆0 + 휃
2
훾
. (10)
3See Kogan (2001), Kogan and Uppal (2002), Chan and Kogan (2002) and Ferretti and Trojani (2005) for
applications of expansion analysis in diﬀerent contexts.
4We verify and conﬁrm in Section 4 that the estimated 휆1 is indeed numerically small, but nonetheless
signiﬁcant.
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Then, up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the agent’s indirect utility 푉푗,푡, his net disposable total
wealth 푁푗,푡, his value of risky asset holdings 푊
푒
푗,푡 ≡ 휋푗,푡푊푗,푡, and his health expenditures 퐼푗,푡 in
the post-retirement phase are:
푉푗,푡 = 휌
(
퐴
휌
) 1
1−휀
푁푗,푡[1− 휆1퐻−휉푗,푡 Δ], (11)
푁푗,푡 = 푊푗,푡 +퐵퐻푗,푡 + 퐶, (12)
푊 푒푗,푡 =
휃
훾휎
푁푗,푡, (13)
퐼푗,푡 = 퐻푗,푡
(
훼퐵
) 1
1−훼 + 휆1퐻
−휉
푗,푡 Δ(훼퐵)
훼
1−훼 휂푁푗,푡, (14)
where 퐵 solves
훽r − (푟 + 훿)퐵 + Φ퐵 11−훼 = 0, (15)
subject to
퐵 >
(푟 + 훿)1−
1
훼
훼
,
and where 퐶, 휂 and Φ are deﬁned by:
퐶 ≡ (푦r − 푎)/푟, (16)
휂 ≡ 훼휉/(1− 훼),
Φ ≡ (1− 훼)훼 훼1−훼 .
The constants 퐴,퐵,퐶,Δ denote respectively the agent’s marginal propensity to consume out of
disposable wealth, the order-0 shadow price (i.e. marginal-푄) of health,5 the net present value
(NPV) of the ﬁxed portion of labor income above subsistence, and a ﬁrst-order correction to the
optimal rules. The theoretical restrictions (8), (9) and (10) guarantee that the agent’s disposable
wealth and value function are ﬁnite and can be interpreted as transversality conditions.
As shown in Hugonnier et al. (2009), this model can jointly reproduce the four main empirical
facts. First, because health positively aﬀects labor income, the capitalized value of labor
revenues is also health-dependent and determines the human capital of the agent, thereby
5As was mentioned earlier, health is valuable because of its dual eﬀects on longevity and on labor income.
The shadow price capturing the labor-income eﬀect only obtains by abstracting from the former (i.e. imposing
휆1 = 0, or order-0 eﬀect) and is given by 퐵. See (24) and the discussion in Section 5 below for estimates of the
total value of health.
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contributing to disposable net worth 푁푗,푡 in (12). Second, the minimal consumption creates
an endogenous liquidity contraint whereby available resources must be kept suﬃciently high
to cover subsistence consumption. Improvements in health and/or wealth increase surplus net
worth thereby allowing the agent to take on more risky asset positions in (13). This rationalizes
the positive health and wealth gradients for risky portfolios found in the data. Third, an increase
in health reduces detrimental mortality risk and, because of cost convexities, lowers the returns
to health expenditures, thereby reducing the attractiveness of health investments. Higher wealth
facilitates substitution in favor of other non-human assets in (14).6 This rationalizes the negative
health and wealth gradients in health expenditures shares data.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present the data, as well as the empirical strategy that we use to conduct
the estimation of the structural model (13) and (14) .
3.1 Data
For our benchmark case, we rely on a cross section composed of the ﬁfth wave (respondents in
2000) of the Health and Retirement Survey data set, a survey of American individuals aged 51
and over.7 The robustness analysis in Section 4.2 considers other waves, and also exploits the
panel dimension in the HRS data.
We construct ﬁnancial wealth as the sum of safe assets (checking and saving accounts, money
market funds, CD’s, government savings bonds and T-bills), bonds (corporate, municipal and
foreign bonds and bond funds), risky assets (stock and equity mutual funds) and retirement
accounts (IRAs and Keoghs). The risky portfolio share is then expressed as the percentage of
ﬁnancial wealth held in risky assets.
Health status is evaluated using the self-reported general health status. This variable has
been shown to be a valid predictor of the objective health status (Ben´ıtez-Silva and Ni, 2008;
Crossley and Kennedy, 2002; Hurd and McGarry, 1995). Health investments are obtained as
the sum of medical expenditures (doctor visits, outpatient surgery, hospital and nursing home,
6This last eﬀect occurs unless health is so low that its high return justiﬁes investing more in one’s health when
ﬁnancial wealth increases.
7We use the HRS distribution made available by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. See
RAND Corporation (2008) for details.
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home health care, prescription drugs and special facilities), and out-of-pocket (OOP) medical
expenses (uninsured cost over the two previous years). Health investment shares are computed
by dividing health investment by ﬁnancial wealth. The estimates presented in Section 4 are
obtained for a scaling of $1M applied to all nominal variables (퐼푗 ,푊푗 , 푌푗) and by expressing the
polytomous self-reported health variable in integer values ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The summary statistics in Table 1 distinguish between non retired individuals (age less than
65) in columns (1)–(3) and retired agents (age 65 and over) in columns (4)–(6). They highlight a
deterioration in health status as well as an increase in health expenditures in the post-retirement
phase. We also notice that riskless assets clearly dominate the ﬁnancial allocations. Direct
holdings of stocks are found in about a third of our sample and correspond to roughly one ﬁfth
of the portfolios, with negligible variations between pre- and post-retirement phases.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 reports summary statistics by health level and gross ﬁnancial wealth quintiles. A
ﬁrst observation concerns the relative insensitivity of ﬁnancial wealth to the health status (see
also Michaud and van Soest, 2008; Meer, Miller and Rosen, 2003; Adams, Hurd, McFadden,
Merrill and Ribeiro, 2003, for additional evidence). Second, we notice the very low participation
rates in stock markets for the poorer and unhealthy agents which increases with health, and
wealth. Direct risky portfolio shares are also increasing in both health and wealth. Similar
positive eﬀects of wealth on risky holdings have been identiﬁed in the literature (e.g. Wachter
and Yogo, 2008; Guiso et al., 1996; Carroll, 2002) whereas positive eﬀects of health have also been
highlighted (e.g. Guiso et al., 1996; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Coile and Milligan, 2009; Berkowitz and
Qiu, 2006; Goldman and Maestas, 2005; Fan and Zhao, 2009; Yogo, 2009). Health expenditures
shares of ﬁnancial wealth, whether total or out-of-pocket display the opposite patterns: They
are sharply decreasing in wealth and in health levels. Similar ﬁndings with respect to wealth
(e.g. Meer et al., 2003; DiMatteo, 2003; Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2009) and
health (e.g. Smith, 1999; Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004; Yogo, 2009) have been discussed elsewhere.
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3.2 Estimation strategy
Our objective is to estimate the deep parameters of the structural model (1)–(5) by using the
optimal rules (13) and (14) subject to the transversality inequalities (8), (9) and (10). Since
the dynamic model is fully amenable to a static as well as a dynamic perspective, we consider
both the cross-sectional and panel perspectives.
The estimation of the structural parameters poses several challenges. First, a sizable percent-
age of the portfolio shares are reported at zero, whereas this is not the case for either the income
or the health expenditures data.8 This implies that some of our dependent variables are possibly
left-censored at zero and that a censored-data (Tobit) estimator is warranted. Second, and
related, the theoretical restrictions in Theorem 1 are highly nonlinear and these nonlinearities
are compounded by the Tobit estimator, thereby making the estimation particularly challenging.
Fortunately, we may observe that, conditional upon a given value for the parameter 휉, the
model in Theorem 1 can be rearranged and regrouped with the income process to reveal a linear
econometric model:
푊 푒푗,푡 = 휃휋,0푊푗,푡 + 휃휋,1퐻푗,푡 + 휃휋,2 + 휈
휋
푗,푡 (17)
퐼푗,푡 = 휃퐼,1퐻푗,푡 + 휃퐼,2퐻
−휉
푗,푡 푊푗,푡 + 휃퐼,3퐻
1−휉
푗,푡 + 휃퐼,4퐻
−휉
푗,푡 + 휈
푖
푗,푡 (18)
푌 r푗,푡 = 푦
r + 훽r퐻푗,푡 + 휈
푦
푗,푡, (19)
where (휈휋푗,푡, 휈
푖
푗,푡, 휈
푦
푗,푡) are potentially correlated error terms, and where the semi-restricted reduced
form (SRF) parameters 휃휋 ∈ ℝ3 and 휃퐼 ∈ ℝ4 are related to the deep parameters as follows:
휃휋,0 =
휃
훾휎
, 휃퐼,1 = (훼퐵)
1
1−훼 ,
휃휋,1 = 휃휋,0퐵, 휃퐼,2 =
훼휆1휉(훼퐵)
훼
1−훼(
휉
(
(훼퐵)
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
+퐴
)
(1− 훼)
,
휃휋,2 = 휃휋,0퐶, 휃퐼,3 = 휃퐼,2퐵,
휃퐼,4 = 휃퐼,2퐶,
(20)
and 퐴,퐵,퐶 are deﬁned as in Theorem 1.
8Speciﬁcally, out of our full sample of 10,735 individuals aged 65 and over, 7,261 (67,6%) reported no direct
portfolio holdings, compared to only 48 (0.4%) reporting no labor income, and 225 (2.1%) reporting no medical
expenditures.
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This formulation suggests adopting a two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage, we compute the
likelihood function for a joint mixture–ML model combining one censored density in (17) with
two continuous densities in (18) and (19).9 This tri-variate econometric model estimates the
SRF parameters 휃휋, 휃퐼 , as well as the structural parameters 푦
r, 훽r, imposing the functional form,
but not the full set of parametric constraints. In the second stage, we estimate the remaining
structural parameters by using a minimum distance estimator between the estimated SRF
parameters and their theoretical counterparts given in (20). The standard errors are computed
by implementing the Delta method. This two-step procedure presents important advantages
over a single-step, fully structural estimation. First, it is considerably easier to implement.10
Second, and as is discussed below, it provides a set of ﬁrst checks of the theoretical model
through the signs of the SRF parameters.
The ﬁrst-stage estimation yields seven free parameters. In order to ensure identiﬁcation
and full compliance with theory, we append the relevant theoretical constraints to (20) in
the second step such that the structural parameters are identiﬁed subject to the nonlinear
transversality inequalities (8), (9) and (10).11 Since the model is under-identiﬁed, we follow
standard approaches in calibrating a subset of the parameters, estimating the remaining deep
parameters, and verifying robustness to key calibrated values. First, a natural choice is to
calibrate the parameters of the ﬁnancial markets (푟, 휎, 휇), as well as the subjective discount rate
(휌) for which data and ample literature both provide guidance. Second, ﬁxing the convexity of
the Poisson intensity (휉) implies that the SRF model is conditionally linear and considerably
facilitates the estimation. We consequently calibrate that parameter and verify robustness in
Section 4.2. Table 3 summarizes the calibrated and estimated parameter subsets.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Several hypotheses can be tested through the joint estimation of the structural parameters.
First, the estimated preference parameters in (1) and (2) allow us to test the null hypotheses
9An alternative interpretation is to consider the zeroes in the portfolios as deliberate choices, rather than
reﬂecting a binding non-negativity (e.g. short-sales) constraint. To take that perspective into consideration,
we also estimated the trivariate model with a continuous density for (17). The results in Section 4 remain
qualitatively robust.
10We also verify and conﬁrm that the results in Section 4 are robust to using a single-step ML estimation of
the fully restricted structural model instead of the two-step procedure.
11It is worth noting that exact identiﬁcation can be achieved if the structural parameters of interest satisfy
the (strict) inequality constraints without imposing them. Otherwise, the inequality constraints will preclude for
such an exact scheme, as in our setting.
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of no aversion to a-temporal risk (훾 = 0), of no subsistence consumption (푎 = 0), of inelastic
inter-temporal substitution of deterministic consumption paths (휀 = 0), as well as the null
of time additive preferences in the absence of mortality risk (휀 = 1/훾). Second, the mortality
intensity parameters in (6) make it possible to test the null hypotheses that there is no exogenous
mortality component (휆0 = 0), and that the agent has no control over mortality risk (휆1 = 0).
Third, the health dynamics parameters in (3) can be used to test whether the agent has some
control over the evolution of his health status (훼 ∕= 0) and whether he faces convex adjustment
costs (훼 ∕= 1) in health investments, in addition to testing that health does not depreciate
exogenously (훿 = 0) in the absence of health expenditures. Finally, we can test for the presence
of health-independent income (푦r = 0) and of health-dependent labor income in the post-
retirement phase (훽r = 0) using the income process parameters in (4). From (15) observe that
the latter is equivalent to testing for zero shadow value of health (퐵 = 0).
4 Results
We ﬁrst discuss the estimation results for the SRF parameters (Table 4), followed by the
structural parameter estimates (Table 5). In Section 4.1, we present the benchmark case
reported in column (1) for both tables. In Section 4.2, we address in-sample and out-of-sample
performance, followed by a discussion of the various robustness checks that are reported in
columns (2)-(9).
4.1 Benchmark case
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the SRF parameters 휃휋, 휃퐼 for the risky
asset levels (17) and health investments levels (18).12 We also indicate the expected sign for
each parameter which is obtained by combining the deﬁnition of the SRF parameters with the
theoretical restrictions summarized in (20).
The estimated SRF parameters provide a ﬁrst indication on the model’s ability to reproduce
the data. First, the parameter 휃휋,0 is signiﬁcantly positive and, given a positive ﬁnancial
risk premia (see the calibrated values in Table 3), is consistent with strictly positive risk
12The deep parameters of the income process (19), which are estimated jointly in the trivariate mixture model,
are reported with the other structural parameters in Table 5. For brevity, we omit the full reporting of the
variance-covariance parameters.
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aversion. Second, the theoretical restrictions outlined in Hugonnier et al. (2009) indicate that
the parameters 휃휋,1, 휃퐼,1, 휃퐼,2, 휃퐼,3 should be positive, which we do observe, with the exception of
휃퐼,2 which has the correct sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant. Third, we should also expect
휃휋,2 < 0 and 휃퐼,4 < 0 for portfolios to be profactually increasing in ﬁnancial wealth.
13 Our
estimates conﬁrm that this is indeed the case.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The SRF parameters thus provide an encouraging ﬁrst evaluation of the model. In particular,
all the seven reduced-form parameters have the correct signs and are (with one exception) all
signiﬁcant. Our next objective is to recover the structural parameters in the second step of our
estimation strategy. This is achieved by minimizing the distance between the SRF parameters
and their theoretical counterparts listed in (20), subject to the transversality inequalities (8),
(9), and (10). Importantly, the preferences, mortality, health dynamics and income process
parameters in Table 5 are all signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and all have the required sign (i.e.
positive).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The estimate for 훾 in (1) is indicative of aversion to atemporal risk and is realistic compared
with the usual standards (e.g. Mehra and Prescott, 1985). The estimate of the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution 휀 in (2) is signiﬁcantly lower than 1 and accords with similar ﬁndings
in the literature (e.g. Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009; Lee, 2008; Biederman and Goenner, 2008;
Saltari and Ticchi, 2007; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002, provide recent examples). Moreover, the
null hypothesis of time additive preferences in the absence of mortality risk (휀 − 1/훾 = 0) is
strongly rejected. Finally, the subsistence consumption parameter 푎 in (2) corresponds to a
minimal consumption of 0.0248 × 106 = $24, 800 which is lower than the mean labor income
of $28,709 for agents over 65, but remains larger than the ﬁxed part of the income process for
retired agents (푦r = $9, 096). This is consistent with agents having to work and/or hold positive
ﬁnancial balances to ﬁnance subsistance consumption.
13To understand this result, observe from (13) that:
Sign
(
∂휋푗,푡
∂푊푗,푡
)
= Sign (−휃휋,1퐻푗,푡 − 휃휋,2) ,
which is positive when 휃휋,2 < 0, given nonnegative health and that 휃휋,1 is expected to be positive. Because we
expect and ﬁnd 휃휋,0 > 0 and that 휃퐼,2 > 0, (20) reveals that 퐶 < 0, and, consequently that 휃퐼,4 < 0.
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Regarding the parameters of the death intensity (6), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant 휆0 pointing towards
an incompressible component to mortality risk. Furthermore, the estimate of the endogenous
mortality parameter 휆1 is low, adding conﬁdence in the expansion method of Hugonnier et al.
(2009) constructed around a small value for that parameter. We nonetheless reject the null
that 휆1 is zero, indicating that the agent can adjust mortality risk through health investments.
Moreover, the estimates for the health dynamics (3) identify a low value for the Cobb-Douglas
parameter 훼 that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both 0 and from 1 as well as a fairly high
depreciation rate for the health stock 훿. This is consistent with agents being able to oﬀset rapid
depreciation in the health status, but having to face large adjustment costs in doing so. Finally,
the parameters of the income process (4) conﬁrm the relevance of both the ﬁxed and of the
health-dependent components in post-retirement labor income.
Implications for health expenditures Our structural estimates are indicative of a dual
motivation for investing in health. First, the strong rejection of the VNM hypothesis (휀 ∕= 1/훾)
and the parameter for risk aversion (훾 > 1) are jointly consistent with unconditional preference
for life. In addition, we ﬁnd that the marginal rate of substitution for consumption across
periods is very low (휀 < 1) indicating that our agents do not appear to substitute easily between
quantity (i.e. length) and quality (i.e. consumption) of life. Taken together, these elements
suggest that an agent reacts to increased mortality risk by investing more in his health, rather
than by consuming more over his shorter time horizon. This can be observed from (7): the
marginal propensity to consume 퐴 is lower following an increase in 휆0 when the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution is low, i.e. 휀 < 1. In particular, an increase in 휆0 can be interpreted
as an decrease in the riskfree rate of interest. At low elasticity, the income eﬀect outweighs the
substitution eﬀect and consumption decreases to ﬁnance more health investment. This response
is consistent since investing more in one’s health to increase life expectancy is not only desirable,
but also feasible as the agent can reduce his death intensity (휆1 ∕= 0).
Second, better health is also valuable in that it allows for increased labor revenues (훽r ∕=
0), notwithstanding the fact that ﬁxed part of labor income remains important in the post-
retirement period (푦r ∕= 0). The latter likely reﬂects the importance of pension revenues while
the former could indicate that many elders still ﬁnd it proﬁtable to continue working after age
14
65, but are forced to reduce hours (and therefore income) when health deteriorates.14 Better
health thus results in higher total disposable wealth (ﬁnancial + human) and consequently
allows for higher consumption. These two channels of higher quantity and quality of life are the
main elements behind positive net investments in health capital. Preferences-based approaches
play no role as health has no other intrinsic value in the model.
The technological constraints facing the agent indicate that health and mortality risk ad-
justments are feasible, but are both subject to strongly convex costs (휉 ≫ 0 and 훼 ≪ 1).
Equivalently, these results imply that the return to health expenditures increases sharply when
health is low and further deteriorates. This would prompt the agent to invest more in health in
adverse health conditions, provided resources (whether ﬁnancial or human wealth) are available.
By a similar reasoning, increasing wealth reduces the health expenditure shares, unless health is
so low (and therefore returns are high) that it becomes more proﬁtable to invest in one’s health
than in other assets.
Finally, our ﬁndings point to the “long reach of childhood” eﬀects (Smith, 1999, 2009) in
mortality risk. Indeed, the bulk of expected longevity stems from the uncontrollable component,
with health investments having much more modest eﬀects (휆0 ≫ 휆1퐻−휉). Taken together, these
results are very likely related to our choice of sample of elderly agents for which investing in
health is concurrently more urgent because of rapid depreciation, more costly because of strong
convexities and less proﬁtable because of the importance of endowed components in income and
mortality compared to younger individuals.
Implications for risky portfolios Our results are also consistent with a binding liquidity
constraint argument to understand how health and wealth aﬀect risky portfolios. First, the low
participation rate in the risky asset market is not explained by excessive risk aversion (훾 < 2),
but occurs because ﬁnancial wealth must be suﬃcient to cover liquidity needs. Indeed, we ﬁnd
that the minimal consumption is quite important (푎≫ 0). This implies that the present value
of income net of health investments and net of subsistence consumption expenditures is negative
(퐵퐻 +퐶 < 0) and that positive ﬁnancial wealth balances have to be maintained. This has two
consequences. First, if he could, a very poor and unhealthy agent would take short positions
in both ﬁnancial and health investments in order to cover subsistence. Whereas the former is
14See French (2005) for similar ﬁndings.
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feasible, irreversibility rules out the latter. Second, an increase in either health or wealth is
tantamount to a relaxation of the agent’s binding liquidity constraint. He thus increases risky
asset holdings unless his health is suﬃciently high that the liquidity contraint no longer binds.
Importantly, the positive eﬀect of health on risky portfolios is neither related to mortality
risk nor to risk aversion eﬀects. Indeed, the predicted portfolio parameters 휃휋,0, 휃휋,1, 휃휋,2 in (17)
are completely independent of the Poisson parameters 휆0, 휆1, 휉. Hence, changing mortality risk
has no ﬁrst-order impact on risky asset holdings.15 The model neither relies on cross eﬀects of
health on risk aversion as the latter is a constant parameter (훾). Rather, the model resorts to
eﬀects of liquidity of health on income to explain why portfolios increase in health.
4.2 Performance and robustness
Performance In order to assess the in-sample performance of the model we compute the
predicted portfolios and health investments and contrast them with observed levels. Speciﬁcally,
for the model (13) and (14), we calculate the predicted portfolio and health investment levels
for all retired agents in our sample.16 We then compute the mean for each age 푡 = {65, 66, . . . }
and compare those age-speciﬁc averages with their HRS counterparts. The results are plotted
in the right-hand sides of Figures 1 (portfolio levels) and Figure 2 (health investment levels).
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Overall, the estimated model appears to reproduce the data quite well.17 In particular,
the estimated risky portfolios in Figure 1 capture both the life-cycle proﬁle and the age-
to-age volatility in HRS sample means. Although less conclusive, the ﬁt for the estimated
health investment shares in Figure 2 remains acceptable in capturing the age-to-age variations.
Admittedly, the model has more diﬃculty in reproducing the long-term age gradient, especially
in the last periods of life where health expenditures tend to explode. This could suggest that
appending age-dependent processes to the theoretical model (e.g. through age-speciﬁc health
15It can be shown that the eﬀects of mortality on risky portfolios are second- and higher-order eﬀects in the
approximation to the solution (Hugonnier et al., 2009). However, those eﬀects are numerically negligible, given
the low estimated value for 휆1. Similar ﬁndings are reported by Puri and Robinson (2007) who ﬁnd that optimism
(measured by self-reported life expectancy) has no impact on portfolio composition.
16Note that the predicted portfolio values incorporate a correction associated with censored data estimated by
Tobit models. See Greene (1990); Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for discussions.
17A word of caution concerns the age-to-age variation which is clearly not indicative of any plausible life-cycle
pattern but rather caused by diﬀerences in the sample means for each age group.
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depreciation and/or mortality risk) might be fruitful. We leave such modiﬁcations on the
research agenda.
One may legitimately inquire about the performance of the model with respect to younger
agents. Indeed, the theoretical model of Hugonnier et al. (2009) is derived under the assump-
tion of age-invariant deep parameters, except for the income process which varies with the
employment status. This assumption can be gauged by computing and comparing the predicted
optimal allocations with the data in the period preceding retirement. For that purpose, replace
the agent’s income (4) by:
푌푡 = 푌 (푡,퐻푡) = 1{푇>푡}푌 e푡 + 1{푇≤푡}푌
r
푡 . (21)
where
푌 푖푡 = 푌
푖(퐻푡) = 푦
푖 + 훽푖퐻푡, (22)
for some nonnegative constants 푦e, 푦r, 훽e and 훽r, and where 푇 = 65 is the retirement age.
We can then combine estimates for the pre-retirement income parameters 푦e, 훽e in the general
income process (21) and (22) with our post-retirement estimates 푦r, 훽r as well as the other deep
parameters to calculate the optimal pre-retirement portfolios and health expenditures using
the age-dependent expressions for 퐵(푡), 퐶(푡), and Δ(푡) reported in Appendix A.18 Since our
parameter estimates are evaluated using post-retirement data exclusively, this approach can be
interpreted as an out-of-sample evaluation of the model. The out-of-sample results plotted in
the left-hand-side of Figures 1 and 2 conﬁrm our earlier in-sample ﬁndings. The model continues
to perform surprisingly well with respect to portfolios and reasonably well with respect to health
expenditures. Overall, we may conclude that the constant deep parameter hypothesis of the
model does not seem to be at odds with the out-of-sample data.
Robustness We next perform various robustness checks that are reported in columns (2)–(9)
of Tables 4 and 5. Regarding the Poisson convexity parameter, we perform an extensive search
procedure to verify the sensitivity in terms of ﬁt and compliance with theoretical restrictions.
18Hugonnier et al. (2009, Table 5) report pre-retirement constant term 푦e = 0.0052 (0.0051) and health
sensitivity 훽e = 0.0130 (0.0014) (standard errors in parentheses) using the same data set.
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To illustrate robustness, we provide results for 휉 ∈ {4.2, 4.7}, our preferred range with respect
to ﬁt, in columns (2) and (3).
Furthermore, we conduct the following additional estimations. First, we assess the impact of
socio-economic covariates that are omitted from the theoretical analysis in column (4). Indeed,
whereas ﬁnancial covariates are explicitly (wealth) and implicitly (income) incorporated into
the model, other variables that are known to predict portfolios and health expenditures are
not. We thus re-estimate the SRF model (17)–(18) by appending age, gender, race, education
and marital status. Second, since the HRS study mainly involves older individuals with an
important attrition rate, potential cohort eﬀects are to be anticipated. To control for these, we
re-estimate the model for the fourth (1998) and sixth (2002) waves in columns (5) and (6).
Third, in order to account for the eﬀects of unobserved heterogeneity, we re-estimate the
model in the panel dimension with results reported in column (7). Speciﬁcally, we construct
a balanced panel of 5,736 individuals using the fourth, ﬁfth and sixth waves of HRS (17,208
observations).19 Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled using random, rather than ﬁxed eﬀects.
This choice is motivated by several concerns. Indeed, ﬁxed eﬀects are both more complicated
to estimate than random eﬀects in mixture models, and more diﬃcult to justify in the absence
of a constant term in the health investment equation (18). In comparison, the second moments
of the error terms for the optimal rules are not restricted by the theoretical model, thereby
allowing complete ﬂexibility in modeling the scedastic structure. Finally, not resorting to ﬁxed
eﬀects is consistent with the assumed representativeness of the HRS sample with respect to the
entire US population of retirees.
Fourth, we control for the impact of health insurance by re-estimating the parameters using
out-of-pocket health expenditures only in column (8). Finally, several studies document a ﬂat
age proﬁle in health expenditures after retirement, but a very rapid increase during the last
periods of life (e.g. Zweifel, Felder and Werblow, 2004; Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson, 2000; Felder,
Meier and Schmitt, 2000). This increase is apparent in Figure 2 where the theoretical model
fares less well at later ages. To take these diﬀerences into account, we re-estimate the model
using agents aged 65-79 only in column (9).
19Using the full HRS set of waves proved impractical for our purposes. As is well known, diﬀerences in
construction methods exists between the initial (waves 1-3) and posterior (waves 4-8) waves (e.g. Love and
Smith, 2010). Also, the attrition rate when using the full set of waves proved to be too important to allow for
the construction of a representative balanced panel of retired agents. For these reasons we restrict our analysis
to waves 4, 5 and 6.
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Overall, all our qualitative results (i.e. compliance with theoretical and sign restrictions,
signiﬁcance) are remarkably robust to the choice of speciﬁcation, whereas the quantitative
impact can be considered as rather limited. In particular, the preference, mortality dynamics
as well as income process parameters are the least sensitive to alternative speciﬁcations. On the
other hand, the health dynamics estimates do vary moderately when socio-economic covariates
are included, for the 1998 wave (although not for the 2002 wave) and when the very old
are omitted. Since the OOP health expenditures are smaller than the total expenditures in
column (8), this has no impact on the portfolio parameters, and only scale eﬀects on the health
expenditure parameters. Nonetheless, the deep parameters remain globally unaﬀected. In light
of these results we conclude that the estimates are qualitatively robust to potential sample and
mis-speciﬁcation errors.
5 Extensions: Longevity, values of life and of health
The following theoretical and empirical results show how the model can be extended to study
the expected lifetime and the willingness to pay for additional longevity and better health. In
addition to providing for new insights on the eﬀects of health and wealth on these variables,
they can act as useful ex-post checks on the estimated parameters.
5.1 Additional theoretical results
The explicit expression for the agent’s value function (11) makes it possible to compute the
implied value of health and of life as the maximum amount of wealth that the agent would be
willing to give-up in order to improve either his health or his life expectancy. Resorting to the
compensating variation approach, we deﬁne the value of 휏ℎ units of additional health as the
solution Δℎ to the indiﬀerence equation
푉 (푊푗,푡 −Δℎ, 퐻푗,푡 + 휏ℎ; (휆0, 휆1)) = 푉 (푊푗,푡, 퐻푗,푡; (휆0, 휆1)) (23)
where 푉 (푊,퐻;휆0, 휆1) denotes the value function of an agent with wealth 푊 , health 퐻 and
mortality parameters (휆0, 휆1). The following proposition relies on an expansion technique
similar to that of Theorem 1 to derive an explicit approximation for the value of health.
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Proposition 1 Assume that equations (8), (9) and (10) hold true. Up to a ﬁrst order approx-
imation the value of one unit of additional health is given by
Δℎ푗,푡 = 퐵휏
ℎ + 휆1푁푗,푡Δ
[
퐻−휉푗,푡 − (퐻푗,푡 + 휏ℎ)−휉
]
(24)
with 퐵, 푁푗,푡 and Δ as in Theorem 1.
By a similar reasoning, if
ℓ(푊,퐻; (휆0, 휆1)) = 퐸푡[휏 ] (25)
denotes the life expectancy of an agent with wealth 푊 , health 퐻 and mortality parameters
(휆0, 휆1), then we can obtain the value of 휏
ℓ additional units of life expectancy as the solution
Δℓ to the indiﬀerence equation
푉 (푊푗,푡 −Δℓ, 퐻푗,푡; (휆∗0, 휆1)) = 푉 (푊푗,푡, 퐻푗,푡; (휆0, 휆1)) (26)
where the modiﬁed intensity 휆∗0 < 휆0 solves
ℓ(푊,퐻; (휆∗0, 휆1)) = 휏
ℓ + ℓ(푊,퐻; (휆0, 휆1)). (27)
We thus reduce the endowed death intensity so as to gain 휏 ℓ units of longevity, and the value
of life is the willingness to pay for that reduction in mortality risk. We again resort to an
expansion technique to derive an explicit approximation for both the life expectancy and the
value of life implied by the theoretical model.
Proposition 2 Assume that equations (8), (9), (10) and
Ψ−1 ≡ 휆0 + 휉
(
(훼퐵)
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
> 0 (28)
hold true. Then up to a ﬁrst order approximation, the life expectancy and the value of 휏 ℓ
additional units of life expectancy are given by
ℓ(푊푗,푡, 퐻푗,푡;휆0, 휆1) =
1
휆0
(
1− 휆1
퐻휉푗,푡
Ψ
)
, (29)
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and
Δℓ푗,푡 = (1− 휒0)푁푗,푡 + 휆1휒0푁푗,푡퐻−휉푗,푡 (Δ−Δ∗ −퐾∗) (30)
where the constants 휒0 ∈ (0, 1), Δ∗ and 퐾∗ are deﬁned by
퐴∗ = 휀휌+ (1− 휀)
(
푟 − 휆0
1 + 휏 ℓ휆0
+
휃2
2훾
)
,
휒0 = (퐴/퐴
∗)
1
1−휀 ,
Δ∗ = 퐴∗ −퐴+ Δ,
퐾∗ = 휏 ℓ
Ψ
퐴∗
(
휆0
1 + 휏 ℓ휆0
)2( 1 + 휆0(휏 ℓ + Ψ)
1 + 휏 ℓ휆0(1− 휆0Ψ)
)
and Δ, 푁푗,푡 are as in Theorem 1.
To understand these results it is useful to distinguish between the two attributes of health:
labor income enhancement and mortality control. If we abstract from the latter by imposing
휆1 = 0, the expected longevity in (29) is then the inverse of the endowed death intensity, and the
value function 푉푗,푡 in (11) is then proportional to net disposable wealth 푁푗,푡 = 푊푗,푡+퐵퐻푗,푡+퐶.
An increase in health raises net disposable wealth by 퐵휏ℎ which must also be deducted from
ﬁnancial wealth in (24) so as to leave the agent indiﬀerent. On the other hand, a reduction
in the endowed mortality risk 휆0 necessary to increase expected lifetime in (27) has no eﬀect
on net disposable wealth, but changes the marginal propensity to consume 퐴 in (7). Since the
marginal propensity to consume determines the factor of proportionality in the value function,
the compensating variation for added longevity in (30) will also be proportional to net disposable
wealth 푁푗,푡.
Allowing for 휆1 ∕= 0 reinstates the mortality control value of health. The expected longevity
in (29) is then lower because of the mechanical increase in the death intensity by 휆1퐻
−휉
푗,푡 .
Because life is always valuable, this increase is detrimental to the agent and the indirect utility
푉푗,푡 in (11) is lower for any given disposable net wealth. The agent is thus willing to pay more
for better health in order to oﬀset that eﬀect, with the increment in valuation reﬂecting the
eﬀectiveness of health in reducing the death intensity. The eﬀect on the value of life, however,
is less apparent under endogenous mortality because of two conﬂicting inﬂuences. On the one
hand the lower endowed intensity is a welcomed counter-measure to the mechanical increase
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in the endogenous intensity. This increases the willingness to pay for longevity. On the other,
a reduction in 휆0 is not as valuable when the agent can aﬀect longevity through his health
decisions, compared to when he cannot. This reduces the willingness to pay. In particular, at
the estimated low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 휀 < 1, the marginal propensity to
consume increases following a reduction in the death intensity (i.e. 퐴∗ > 퐴, implying Δ < Δ∗).
However, because of the mechanical increase in the death intensity, the required decline in 휆0
is more important under endogenous mortality, i.e. (휆∗0)′(휆1) < 0 which implies that 퐾∗ < 0 in
(45). The net eﬀect on the value of life is captured by the term (Δ −Δ∗ −퐾∗) in (30) whose
sign remains uncertain.
5.2 Implied variables
We ﬁrst calculate the value of health corresponding to a 1 unit increase in 퐻, i.e. 휏ℎ = 1, using
(24). The corresponding values are plotted in Figure 3 for various health and wealth levels.20
These plots reveal that health values rapidly converge to their labor income value 퐵 = $60, 205,
an estimate which is comparable to those found in the literature.21 An exception is observed for
the richer, but unhealthy individuals, who value health more. This can be understood from (24)
where the mortality control value increases at low health levels but rapidly becomes negligible
when health improves given both the predominance of the endowed death probability and the
very high degree of cost convexities faced by elders in adjusting mortality.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The implied life expectancy (29) can be compared with expected lifetime estimated by
Lubitz, Cai, Kramarow and Lentzner (2003) for an individual aged 70, again at various self-
reported health levels. The results reported in Table 6 show that our model is able to ﬁt the
expected lifetime quite well even though we somewhat underestimate the health gradient. This
last caveat may be explained by the relatively high value of the convexity parameter 휉 which
tends to dampen the eﬀect of health on the mortality intensity. Nonetheless, the life expectancy
(29) remains an increasing function of health , and, given health, is independent of wealth. Both
20Very low health and wealth levels correspond to negative disposable to total wealth 푁푗,푡 and are not reported.
21For example, Murphy and Topel (2006, Fig. 9, p. 901) report estimates for health beneﬁts unrelated to
mortality control (referred to as “quality of life” or “type-H” beneﬁts) below $100,000 at age 85.
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facts are consistent with empirical ﬁndings by De Nardi, French and Jones (2009) and by Hurd,
McFadden and Merrill (2001).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Using (30), we next look at the annuitized values of life corresponding to a 1-year increase
in expected lifetime, i.e. 휏 ℓ = 1 , and plot the results in Figure 4. We ﬁnd that an agent
aged 75 with $300,000 ﬁnancial wealth would be willing to pay between $35,000 (poor health)
and $276,000 (excellent health) for an additional year of longevity. Interestingly, these can be
contrasted with age-adjusted value of statistical life year (VSLY) estimates, conﬁrming that our
results are again close to those found in the literature.22
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The estimates are consistent with wealthier and healthier agents willing to pay more for an
increase in expected lifetime. Indeed, the low estimated 휆1 and high calibrated 휉 imply that
the value of life (30) is dominated by the exogenous mortality term (1 − 휒0)푁푗,푡 and that the
endogenous mortality component is negligible. Since net disposable wealth increases in both
health and wealth, it follows that richer and healthier agents value longevity more.
6 Conclusion
Financial wealth and health status are strong predictors of risky portfolios and health expendi-
ture shares of wealth with the former increasing and the latter falling in both variables. Potential
explanations include longevity, utility-based and human-capital arguments. This paper proposes
a structural empirical analysis to distinguish among these competing hypotheses. Using survey
data on retired agents’ health expenditures and ﬁnancial allocations, we estimate the preference,
technological and risk distribution parameters of the closed-form solutions to a joint dynamic
model of health accumulation, consumption and asset allocations.
We ﬁnd that health and mortality adjustments remain both desirable and feasible, but
subject to steeply decreasing returns and rapid depreciation. Taken together, these results imply
22In particular, Aldy and Viscusi (2008, Fig. 2, p. 579) report VSLY estimates between $100,000 and $350,000
at age 62. Murphy and Topel (2006, p. 886) ﬁnd VSLY estimates of $373,00 at age 50 and falling by 50% at age
80.
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that the eﬀects of health and wealth on health investment shares can be entirely accounted for
by longevity and human-capital arguments, whereas the corresponding eﬀects on portfolios are
explained by the latter exclusively without resorting to utility-based rationales, such as health-
dependent risk aversion. Some important extensions can also be obtained from the estimated
parameters. Indeed, our corresponding estimates of expected longevity, as well as the values
of life and health compare advantageously with other estimates in the literature. They also
provide new insights on how these variables are aﬀected by health and wealth levels.
Future research could fruitfully relax some of the restrictions that are necessary to solve the
model. For instance, the locally deterministic health process could be replaced by a stochastic
one. We also pointed out that incorporating age-dependent processes for health depreciation
and/or health-independent mortality risk could prove useful additions to capture the steep age
gradient found in health expenditures. Moreover, inelastic labor supply could be replaced by
preference for leisure. This last modiﬁcation would, in our mind, allow for interesting analysis
of the observed co-movements between macro cycles, health expenditures and labor supply
decisions that have been identiﬁed in the recent literature.
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A General closed-form solutions
The general case with pre- (푇 > 푡) and post-retirement (푇 ≤ 푡) periods is developed in
Hugonnier et al. (2009) and is reproduced here for completeness. Speciﬁcally, consider the pre-
and post-retirement income process given by (21) and (22). The general solution is obtained by
replacing age-independent 퐵,퐶,Δ by their age-dependent values 퐵(푡), 퐶(푡),Δ(푡) in Theorem 1
(the marginal propensity 퐴 in (7) remains unaﬀected). The age-dependent shadow price of
health 퐵(푡) is given as:
퐵(푡) = 1{푇>푡}퐵e(푡) + 1{푇≤푡}퐵r (31)
where 퐵r, 퐵e(⋅) ≥ 0 solve
푔(퐵r) = 훽
r − (푟 + 훿)퐵r + Φ퐵
1
1−훼
r = 0, (32)
퐵′e(푡) = (푟 + 훿)퐵e(푡)− 훽e − Φ퐵e(푡)
1
1−훼 , (33)
퐵e(푇 ) = 퐵r, (34)
subject to 푔′(퐵r) < 0 and where we deﬁne Φ ≡ (1 − 훼)훼
훼
1−훼 . The age-dependent NPV of the
health-independent part of income net of subsistence 퐶(푡) is given as:
퐶(푡) =
∫ 푇∧ 푡
푡
푒−푟(푠−푡)
(
푦e − 푎)푑푠+ ∫ ∞
푇∧ 푡
푒−푟(푠−푡)
(
푦r − 푎)푑푠, (35)
Finally, the nonnegative and age-dependent function Δ(푡) is given by:
Δ(푡) = 1{푇>푡}Δe(푡) + 1{푇≤푡}Δr, (36)
where Δr,Δe(⋅) solve:
0 = Δr
(
휉(훼퐵r)
훼
1−훼 − 휉훿 +퐴
)
− 1, (37)
Δe(푡) = 푒
− ∫ 푇푡 휁(푠)d푠Δr +
∫ 푇
푡
푒−
∫ 푠
푡 휁(푢)d푢d푠, (38)
Δe(푇 ) = Δr (39)
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and where
휁(푡) = 휉(훼퐵(푡))
훼
1−훼 − 휉훿 +퐴.
It is straightforward to verify that the corresponding post-retirement values 퐵,퐶,Δ are given
by (15), (16) and (10).
B Propositions 1 and 2
Value of health Consider an agent with wealth 푊 , health 퐻 and mortality parameters
(휆0, 휆1) and denote by Δ
ℎ = Δℎ(휆1) the value of to this agent of 휏
ℎ units of additional health.
Expanding both sides of equation (23) to the ﬁrst order in 휆1 we obtain
표(휆21) = 푉 (푊 −Δℎ(0), 퐻 + 휏ℎ; (휆0, 0))− 푉 (푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))
+ 휆1[푉푊 (푊 −Δℎ(0), 퐻 + 휏ℎ; (휆0, 0))(−Δℎ)′(0)
+ 푉휆1(푊 −Δℎ(0), 퐻 + 휏ℎ; (휆0, 0))− 푉휆1(푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))].
On the other hand, using the results of Theorem 1 we get that the value function satisﬁes
푉 (푊,퐻; (휆0, 휆1)) = 휌(퐴/휌)
1
1−휀 (푊 +퐵퐻 + 퐶)
(
1− 휆1Δ퐻−휉
)
+ 표(휆21). (40)
Inserting this into the above expansion and simplifying shows that
표(휆21) = 퐵휏
ℎ −Δℎ(0)− 휆1(Δℎ)′(0)
+ 휆1Δ
[
(푊 +퐵퐻 + 퐶)퐻−휉 −
(
푊 −Δℎ(0) +퐵(퐻 + 휏ℎ) + 퐶
)
(퐻 + 휏ℎ)−휉
]
.
Setting both terms on the right hand side to zero then gives
Δℎ(0) = 휏ℎ퐵, (41)
(Δℎ)′(0) = Δ
[
퐻−휉 − (퐻 + 휏ℎ)−휉
]
(42)
and it follows that up to a ﬁrst order approximation the value of health is given by
Δℎ(휆1) = Δ
ℎ(0) + 휆1(Δ
ℎ)′(0) = 휏ℎ퐵 + 휆1Δ
[
퐻−휉 − (퐻 + 휏ℎ)−휉
]
(43)
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as claimed in the statement.
Expected longevity The approximation of the life expectancy in equation (29) is derived in
Hugonnier et al. (2009, Proposition 2). We omit the details.
Value of life Consider an agent with wealth 푊 , health 퐻 and mortality parameters (휆0, 휆1).
Denote by Δℓ = Δℓ(휆1) the value of to this agent of 휏
ℓ units of additional life expectancy and
by 휆∗0(휆1) the solution to equation (27). Expanding equations (27) and (26) to the ﬁrst order
in 휆1 we obtain
표(휆21) = ℓ(푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))− ℓ(푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))− 휏 ℓ
+ 휆1[ℓ푊 (푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))(−Δℓ)′(0) + ℓ휆0(푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))(휆∗0)′(0)
+ ℓ휆1(푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻 + 휏 ℓ; (휆∗0(0), 0))− ℓ휆1(푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))],
표(휆21) = 푉 (푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))− 푉 (푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))
+ 휆1[푉푊 (푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))(−Δℓ)′(0) + 푉휆0(푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))(휆∗0)′(0)
+ 푉휆1(푊 −Δℓ(0), 퐻; (휆∗0(0), 0))− 푉휆1(푊,퐻; (휆0, 0))].
Inserting the ﬁrst order expansion of the life expectancy into the ﬁrst equation and setting both
sides to zero shows that
휆∗0(0) =
휆0
1 + 휏 ℓ휆0
,
(휆∗0)
′(0) = (휆∗0(0))
2퐻−휉
(
Ψ
휆0
− Ψ
∗
휆∗0(0)
)
where we have set
(Ψ∗)−1 = Ψ−1 + 휆∗0(0)− 휆0. (44)
Inserting this as well as the explicit expression for the value function into the second equation
and setting both sides of the resulting equation to zero then gives
Δℓ(0) = (1− 휒0)(푊 +퐵퐻 + 퐶),
(Δℓ)′(0) = 휒0(푊 +퐵퐻 + 퐶)퐻−휉
[
Δ−Δ∗ − (휆
∗
0)
′(0)
퐻−휉퐴∗
]
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where the constants Δ, Δ∗, 퐴, 퐴∗ and 휒0 are deﬁned as in the statement. The desired result
now follows by observing that
퐾∗ =
(휆∗0)′(0)
퐻−휉퐴∗
(45)
does not depend on the agent’s health.
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C Figures and tables
Figure 1: Actual vs predicted portfolio levels
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Notes: In sample, age 65+: Actual and predicted risky portfolio levels for optimal rule (13).
Calibrated value of 휉 = 3.8. Out-of-sample, age 51-64: Actual and predicted portfolio levels
for structural model in Appendix A, evaluated at benchmark structural parameter estimates
(column (1) of Table 5).
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Figure 2: Actual vs predicted health investment levels
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Notes: In sample, age 65+: Actual and predicted health investment levels, for optimal rule
(14). Calibrated value of 휉 = 3.8. Out-of-sample, age 51-64: Actual and predicted portfolio
levels for structural model in Appendix A, evaluated at benchmark structural parameter
estimates (column (1) of Table 5).
Figure 3: Value of health
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Notes: Value of 1 unit of additional health computed using (24), evaluated at benchmark
structural parameter estimates (column (1) of Table 5). Low values of 푊,퐻 correspond to
negative disposable total wealth and are note reported.
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Figure 4: Value of life
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Notes: Value of 1-year extension in expected longevity computed using (30), evaluated at
benchmark structural parameter estimates (column (1) of Table 5). Low values of 푊,퐻
correspond to negative disposable total wealth and are note reported.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Non retired (age < 65) Retired (age ≥ 65)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All sample Single Couple All sample Single Couple
Socio-demographic
Age 57.6 58.7 57.2 75.0 77.8 73.0
Male 40% 29% 44% 42% 22% 57%
Health status
Poor (퐻 = 1) 7% 11% 6% 11% 14% 9%
Fair (퐻 = 2) 15% 20% 14% 22% 24% 20%
Good (퐻 = 3) 29% 29% 29% 31% 31% 32%
Very good (퐻 = 4) 32% 27% 34% 26% 23% 28%
Excellent (퐻 = 5) 16% 14% 17% 10% 8% 11%
Health expenditures
Medical $8,755 $10,186 $8,337 $12,848 $15,517 $10,902
(median) $1,350 $1,439 $1,331 $2,303 $2,680 $2,047
Out-of-pocket $1,860 $1,911 $1,845 $3,014 $3,588 $2,593
(median) $800 $700 $840 $1,040 $960 $1,120
Total $10,615 $12,097 $10,182 $15,862 $19,105 $13,495
(median) $2,779 $2,981 $2,729 $5,000 $5,000 $4,788
Asset holdings
Hold safe asset 86% 75% 89% 85% 78% 90%
Hold bond 7% 4% 7% 9% 6% 11%
Hold risk asset 33% 20% 37% 32% 23% 39%
Have debt 38% 38% 38% 18% 16% 20%
Portfolio composition
Financial wealth $98,727 $62,330 $109,369 $122,573 $74,754 $157,524
Safe assets 57% 63% 55% 65% 70% 62%
Bonds 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Risky assets 22% 14% 24% 20% 16% 23%
Debt 19% 22% 18% 12% 12% 13%
Observations 8,836 1,999 6,837 10,735 4,532 6,202
Notes: Data source is HRS (RAND version), 5푡ℎ wave, respondents in 2000. The reported
ﬁnancial variables are conditional on non-zero holdings.
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Table 2: Summary statistics by gross ﬁnancial wealth and health for retired agents
Gross ﬁnancial wealth quintile
Health 1 2 3 4 5
Poor (퐻 = 1)
Wealth $24 $1,923 $18,296 $78,636 $463,592
푃 (risky > 0) 1% 4% 18% 45% 79%
Risky assets 2% 2% 10% 26% 46%
Health inv. share (total) 17659% 1221% 117% 21% 7%
(out-of-pocket) 938% 86% 15% 5% 1%
Fair (퐻 = 2)
Wealth $29 $2,168 $18,929 $75,273 $560,434
푃 (risky > 0) 0% 3% 19% 47% 76%
Risky assets 0% 2% 10% 26% 43%
Health inv. share (total) 5885% 418% 32% 11% 2%
(out-of-pocket) 630% 63% 9% 3% 1%
Good (퐻 = 3)
Wealth $27 $2,446 $18,467 $78,126 $477,701
푃 (risky > 0) 0% 7% 23% 49% 79%
Risky assets 0% 4% 12% 27% 46%
Health inv. share (total) 4090% 185% 22% 6% 1%
(out-of-pocket) 713% 42% 7% 2% 0%
Very good (퐻 = 4)
Wealth $27 $2,603 $18,717 $80,850 $513,559
푃 (risky > 0) 1% 6% 30% 57% 83%
Risky assets 5% 3% 14% 31% 51%
Health inv. share (total) 2391% 111% 15% 4% 1%
(out-of-pocket) 601% 33% 6% 1% 0%
Excellent (퐻 = 5)
Wealth $20 $2,534 $18,715 $79,227 $592,712
푃 (risky > 0) 1% 4% 29% 49% 84%
Risky assets 6% 2% 16% 25% 49%
Health inv. share (total) 3417% 86% 9% 2% 1%
(out-of-pocket) 185% 24% 3% 1% 0%
Notes: Data source is HRS (RAND version), 5푡ℎ wave, respondents in 2000. Agents of age
65 and over only. The reported values are respectively the mean of the gross ﬁnancial wealth,
the mean of the probability of holding risky assets, the mean of the risky portfolio share and
the median of the health investment share out of net ﬁnancial wealth.
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Table 3: Summary of calibrated and estimated parameters
Notation Calibrated Estimated
Preferences (Eqs.(1),(2))
Discount rate 휌 0.025
Risk aversion 훾 ✓
EIS 휀 ✓
Subsistence cons. 푎 ✓
Death intensity (Eq.(6))
Convexity 휉 ∈ [3.8, 4.7]
Exogenous 휆0 ✓
Health sensitivity 휆1 ✓
Health dynamics (Eq.(3))
Convexity 훼 ✓
Depreciation 훿 ✓
Income dynamics (Eq.(4))
Constant 푦r ✓
Health sensitivity 훽r ✓
Financial markets (Eq.(5))
Interest rate 푟 0.048
Std. error risky return 휎 0.200
Mean risky return 휇 0.108
Notes: The calibrated and estimated parameters are for the econometric model of eqs. (17),
(18) and (19).
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Table 4: SRF parameter estimates
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(exp. sign) 휉 = 3.8 휉 = 4.2 휉 = 4.7 휉 = 4.1 휉 = 3.8 휉 = 3.9 휉 = 4.5 휉 = 4.2 휉 = 4.2
휃휋,0 0.8514*** 0.8514*** 0.8514*** 0.8313*** 0.9401*** 0.8945*** 0.8007*** 0.8480*** 0.8146***
(+) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0066)
휃휋,1 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0110*** 0.0251*** 0.0250*** 0.0173*** 0.0210*** 0.0204***
(+) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023)
휃휋,2 −0.2751*** −0.2751*** −0.2751*** −0.4950*** −0.3474*** −0.2968*** −0.2773*** −0.2668*** −0.2382***
(−) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0160) (0.0112) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0083)
휃퐼,1 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0017*** −0.0001 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0004*** 0.0013***
(+) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002)
휃퐼,2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0027 −0.0002 0.0006 0.0009*** 0.0024
(+) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0024)
휃퐼,3 0.0642*** 0.0779*** 0.0995*** 0.0629*** 0.0466*** 0.0506*** 0.0693*** 0.0118*** 0.0686***
(+) (0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0045)
휃퐼,4 −0.0545*** −0.0692*** −0.0918*** −0.0548*** −0.0387*** −0.0434*** −0.0633*** −0.0105*** −0.0607***
(−) (0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0045)
Wave(s) 2000 2000 2000 2000 1998 2002 1998–2002 2000 2000
Health expend. total total total total total total total OOP total
Socio. econ. cova. no no no yes no no no no no
Age group 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65 65–79
Panel + rand. ef. no no no no no no yes no no
Notes: The parameters correspond to the semi-restricted trivariate estimation of mixture
continuous (for 푌푗 , 퐼푗) and Tobit (for 휋푗푊푗) processes by maximum likelihood. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses, as well as statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level (***), 5%
level (**) and at the 10% level (*). The unreported scedastic parameters can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
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Table 5: Structural parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Parameter 휉 = 3.8 휉 = 4.2 휉 = 4.7 휉 = 4.1 휉 = 3.8 휉 = 3.9 휉 = 4.5 휉 = 4.2 휉 = 4.2
훾 1.7663*** 1.7689*** 1.7665*** 1.8169*** 1.5681*** 1.6798*** 1.8764*** 1.7727*** 1.8476***
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0137)
휀 0.2807*** 0.1748*** 0.2968*** 0.2314*** 0.2309*** 0.2292*** 0.2234*** 0.3985*** 0.2350***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
푎 0.0247*** 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0380*** 0.0254*** 0.0259*** 0.0328*** 0.0248*** 0.0234***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
휆0 0.0832*** 0.0787*** 0.0840*** 0.0803*** 0.0837*** 0.0822*** 0.0603*** 0.0612*** 0.0801***
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0190)
휆1 0.0037*** 0.0059*** 0.0057*** 0.0078*** 0.0029*** 0.0038*** 0.0135*** 0.0019*** 0.0053***
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0011)
훼 0.2255*** 0.2147*** 0.2275*** 0.4277*** 0.1076*** 0.2360*** 0.3315*** 0.2057*** 0.1114***
(0.0580) (0.0620) (0.0565) (0.0118) (0.0368) (0.0570) (0.0540) (0.0710) (0.0344)
훿 0.2817*** 0.2994*** 0.2789*** 0.0778*** 0.5324*** 0.2542*** 0.1113*** 0.3157*** 0.5375***
(0.0128) (0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.1169) (0.0149) (0.0439) (0.0816) (0.1090)
푦r 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0076*** 0.0099*** 0.0159*** 0.0097*** 0.0092***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0017)
훽r 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0054*** 0.0056*** 0.0032*** 0.0066*** 0.0070***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Wave(s) 2000 2000 2000 2000 1998 2002 1998–2002 2000 2000
Health expend. total total total total total total total OOP total
Socio. econ. cova. no no no yes no no no no no
Age group 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65+ 65 65–79
Panel + rand. ef. no no no no no no yes no no
Notes: The parameters correspond to the second step estimates of structural parameters.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, as well as statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
(***), 5% level (**) and at the 10% level (*).
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Table 6: Implied longevity
Implied expected lifetime
퐻 = 1 퐻 = 2 퐻 = 3 퐻 = 4 퐻 = 5
Data 9.17 11.26 12.64 13.38 13.79
ℓ(퐻) 11.57 11.98 12.01 12.01 12.01
Notes: The data row reports expected longevity at age 70 (source, Lubitz et al., 2003, Figure 2,
p. 1052), the model values ℓ(퐻) are the implied longevity given by (29). All implied values and
thresholds obtained for benchmark structural parameter estimates (column (1) of Table 5).
43
